

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WAR OF EXTERMINATION.—The faction, in this country, who began, and who have so long been such strenuous advocates, under all circumstances, the war against France, have been, on many occasions, and upon tolerably good grounds, accused of wishing for a war of *extermination*; but, I do not know, that they have, until this time, ever *openly* and *unequivocally* avowed such wishes. Heretofore, they have usually disguised their real views under the pretence of wanting to obtain *security*, *safety*, the *independence*, or the *deliverance* of Europe. Now, however, they, without disguise whatever, come forward, and express the ardent desire never to have peace with France, till the Sovereign of that country is deposed; nay, until he be *put to death as a malefactor*.—These sentiments are expressed in an article, published in the Courier news-paper of about a fortnight ago, under the title of a Meeting, held at the Thatched-House Tavern, in St. James's-street, on the 12th of February. I shall insert this article at full length. It is a great curiosity in its way. It will deserve attention hereafter; and, it will certainly account, in some measure, for any bitterness of hostility which may be discovered by Napoleon against this country, should he chance to survive his dangers, and to triumph over a combination, the greatest that ever was, I believe, known, or heard of, in the world.—The article to which I allude, and on which I am about to comment, was published in the following words:—"At a meeting of Gentlemen at the Thatched-House Tavern, St. James's-street, Saturday, 12th of February, 1814, the following Public Address was agreed to:—Approaching, as we now seem, to the conclusion of a warfare, that has been sustained for the maintenance of Government and the social system, against the assaults of the French Revolution, during a period of more than 10 years, it appears to us, that a Declaration from the people at large, of sentiments that are suited to the circumstances of the present moment, will be highly

"useful to the great Cause, and will contribute to strengthen the Government in their measure of negotiating with the Allies.—It appears to us, that the people of this kingdom, having made trial of one Peace, which was used by the Ruler of France only as an interval of breathing and recruiting for levying fresh war upon his neighbours, have, for years, made up their mind to the necessity of carrying on war as long as the same monster is endured by the French nation as their Ruler. There is, accordingly, throughout this prosperous nation, no call for peace, as has been in all former wars. Persons of all classes acquiesce, with patience and with fortitude, in the burdens and misfortunes attendant on the defensive struggle, which is to protect us against the slavery imposed upon others, who did not so defend themselves. Happily the Sovereigns and the People of the Continent have, at length, followed our example; and the whole of Europe is now united against the common enemy, who appears, at last, to be at their mercy, pursued, as he is, into his own territory, where there is *no sign of a disposition in the people to stand by him, and save him from military execution*.—In this crisis of Europe, it is our opinion, our earnest prayer, and our firm hope, that there will be no contract, no treaty, no parley, with the Man whom the French still suffer to be their representative among the Powers of Europe. He is a *known liar*, *impostor*, *thief*, and *murderer*; one who would not be borne, as a private person, in a low station of life from which he had been raised during the reign of wickedness in France. And how can Britons consent that their King should enter into covenant with such a one, as his equal! or that a British Nobleman or Gentleman should be degraded to the office of treating, or holding converse, with such instruments of assassination and villany as are the Ministers and Servants of such a Monster! The like repugnance, we are sure, must be felt in the breasts of our Allies; because it must be wherever

“there is any thing royal, any thing noble, any thing honest. But *we having been the leaders in this war*, it seems peculiarly our province to give the word, and be the first to proclaim our opinion, with whom it can, and with whom it cannot, be terminated. — While we declare thus peremptorily against peace with the hateful Ruler of France, we are conscious that we speak only from a desire and a love of peace; being fully persuaded, that such happy state is never to be enjoyed while that man has the power of disturbing it, whenever it suits his projects of rapine and desolation so to do; and being convinced, as we are, that such a sentence of disqualification, pronounced against him by the Allied Powers, is the last step that need be taken for terminating the war, and restoring the former state of things in Europe. *It would be a signal to the French people to do justice on their oppressor, whom they have long determined not to spare at home*, when they once see him thoroughly beaten and discredited abroad. — The contempt, the hatred, the abhorrence of that man's character, have long been general throughout this country; and, on the present occasion, we believe it to be a general sentiment, that he ought not to be recognised as a Sovereign Prince, and treated with for peace; *but rather, that justice should be done upon him as a malefactor*. If this is really a general sentiment, we trust it will be generally declared. It is a time for the people to raise their voice through the country. When the French first made war upon us with their revolutionary principles, and their revolutionary hostilities, the people spoke for themselves, in support of the King and Constitution; and it was their public declarations and associations that gave a tone to the exertions of Government, which has been our main support through this long warfare. The contest seems now to be reduced to one single object, *the overthrow of the odious Tyrant himself*. Let the people now shew themselves, to put a finishing hand to their own war. Let them declare against a peace with the Tyrant of France. When the *popular opinion of this nation is once declared*, we shall see what will be the conduct of the King's government; and, very soon after, we shall see what will happen in France.—PRO REGE ET POPULO.” — Here, then, it is openly avowed, that we

ought to continue the war, until we have killed Napoleon, or caused the French to kill him. Motives of safety for ourselves; safety for Europe; motives of conquest, of honour, are all laid aside; we are now to spend our money and shed our blood, in this holy war, for the destruction of one man, and for the forcing upon the French nation, that great, populous, gallant, polite, and ingenious nation, a government, or, at least, a ruler, whom they now have chosen to set up over them. — This impudent faction say, that they have a great majority of the people of this country with them. I do not believe it; but, if it were so, that would not change the nature of the doctrine which they promulgate. It would only prove, that it is more extensively prevalent, and would, to every just mind, afford additional cause of regret. — The French people are appealed to by this impudent and bloody faction. This faction, who only want the courage to make them murderers and assassins, tell us, that if the whole of this nation were to join them in an expression of their sentiments, it would be “a signal to the French people to do justice on their oppressor, whom they have resolved not to spare at home, when once they see him thoroughly beaten and discredited abroad.” — Now, how impudently false are these facts! Napoleon, owing to his having confided in his German allies, has been thoroughly beaten abroad: his enemies, consisting of all the old governments of Europe, and of their fleets and armies, have driven him into France; they have invaded France on both sides, and nearly all round; they have marched to within 40 miles of Paris. And, have we seen any one symptom of his being hated by the French people? If they had been resolved not to spare him, why have they spared him? Does not his army rise up, as it were, by magic, at the sound of his voice? Is he not now exposed to that vengeance, which we have so long been told the people of France have in store for him? And yet, this blood-thirsty faction would persuade us, that the people of France are, above all things, desirous of his destruction! — But, we are told, that they are to do justice upon him; that is to assassinate him; or, at least, kill him somehow or other; whence we may fairly conclude, that the same faction have approved if not been the instigators, of all the bungling attempts at assassination, which have been made by persons going into this country; and we can hardly help

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admiring the magnanimity of the people of France, who have never attempted any act of retaliation. These men of blood do not seem to reflect on the *example* that they are giving, which example, if the people of France were base and bloody enough to follow it, might lead to the horrible deed of murdering our own sovereign. It must have occurred to most people to observe, that while our public prints are filled with such abominable sentiments as those above expressed; that, while our prints call the Emperor of France all sorts of foul names; that, while they assert, in so many words, that the sovereign, to whom our great and good Ally, the Emperor of Austria, gave his daughter in marriage, and by whom she has a son, heir to her husband's throne, is "a liar, an impostor, a thief, a tyrant, a murderer, and a monster," the French prints never utter a syllable of personal abuse of any of our Royal Family, but as carefully abstain from it as if the authors were liable to even our own *libel laws* for such abuse; and that while our prints are incessantly inculcating the right and the duty of the French people to assassinate their sovereign, the French prints express regret at the unhappy state of our good old king, and leave us in quiet to bestow our love and admiration upon him and all his family, contenting themselves with censuring, and that, too, in the most dignified tone and manner, the views, the policy, and the acts of our government; so that, the Paris papers scarcely ever contain an article, which our libel laws would not let pass, and which even I myself might not publish as my own production with impunity.—This contrast is no less striking than it is humiliating to us as a nation; and, if the two nations were to be judged of by it, how little, how low, how contemptible must England appear by the side of France!—And, upon what *ground* do the men of blood accuse Napoleon of being an *oppressor* of the people of France? It has been shown, that his code of laws is admirable; it has been shown that the Bourbons themselves, in order to give their way to restoration, have been induced to promise the French people the continuance of that code; it has been shown, that he has done a great deal for the happiness and even for the liberty of France. Why are not these statements *answered*? Why does not some one of the men of blood show, that these statements are false? They never enter the field of argument with us. They never appear to take any notice of the facts

and reasoning on the side of the man, whose blood they thirst for. They do, however, know of them and feel their weight; but this only excites their rage, as it usually happens with those, who find themselves beaten in argument. They have read the *answer to the Bourbon Proclamation*; they have read the articles upon the subject of *Moreau*; they have read the several articles upon the subject of the state of France and the disposition of the people towards Napoleon. They know, they *must* know, that these articles contain facts and arguments that entitle them to an answer; but, *unable* to answer, they fall, like the lowest of the vulgar, to vile and odious railing. They are not ignorant, that men of sense and candour are on our side, because sense and candour yield to convincing proof in spite of prejudice; but, they are aware, at the same time, that the mass of the people are guided by their prejudices, cherished by the mass of the public prints; and, though the men of blood know that the sense and candour of the country hold them and their doctrine in abhorrence, they care little for that, provided they secure the mass of the people, and thereby keep alive the delusion that keeps alive the war.—But, upon what *ground*, again, do these men of blood presume, that a declaration of their sentiments, supposing it to become general in England, would influence the people of France, and induce them to abandon, or to murder, Napoleon? It is presumption in the highest and most ridiculous degree to suppose, that the French nation, consisting of thirty millions of men, the most active, most intelligent, most brave, and most proud of national glory in the world, would kill their sovereign merely because the thirteen or fourteen millions of people in these islands wished them to do it. If we could suppose it possible for such a declaration to have any influence at all upon their minds, we must suppose that it would be to make them love him more than ever; and I have, for my part, not the smallest doubt, that, if they ever do hear of the publications of the blood-men, those publications are very useful to Napoleon, as they must say to the people of France: "this is the man whom you ought to cherish, because, you see, that those who wish your humiliation, and who boast of being the *leader* of your invaders, so anxiously desire his death." Besides, suppose the people of France to receive and read such a declaration, might they not, and would they not, answer in somewhat

this way: 'Why do you wish us to destroy Napoleon? At the beginning of the war, you professed to fight against us, who had then declared ourselves *republicans*, in order to prevent the extension of our *disorganizing principles* to yourselves. There were some amongst us who said, that your government feared the effect of the example of freedom that we were giving to mankind; but, at any rate, all your public declarations professed your object to be to prevent the overthrow of *regular government*. Well! We have given up those disorganizing principles. Our government is as *regular* as that of England, or any of her numerous Allies, and, it is Napoleon who has made it so; why, therefore, would you have us assassinate Napoleon? At a later period, the war, on your part, assumed a garb of holiness. You were shocked at our irreligious principles, and you received, with open arms, those priests, monks, and friars, whom you formerly denominated cheats and impostors, and for listening to whom you abused us very grossly. You shed tears of pious pity over the fall of the Pope, whom you had formerly called Anti-Christ and the Scarlet Whore of Babylon. Your war against us now became a war for regular government and holy religion; and you listened with the zeal of converts to those who told you, that if you did not freely pay for the support of the war, we should deprive you "of the *blessed comforts of religion*."—Well! We are no longer of our, then, way of thinking, or, at least, we do not shock you with our Deistical notions. Religion, our old religion, is on foot again; masses are sung in all our churches; the good wives and their daughters go regular to confess their sins, and they count their beads, as formerly; and your religion, too, is fully tolerated amongst us, and, indeed, enjoyed, not as an indulgence, but as a *right*.—This change has been made by Napoleon. Why, therefore, do you call upon us to murder him? Why do you so eagerly seek his life at our hands? Why would you have us assassinate him, who has relieved you from all danger of being deprived by us of those "*blessed comforts of religion*," for which that worthy veteran George Rose, called on you to pay and fight, and who has restored those inestimable blessings even to us? Why, you men of blood, would you urge us to stick our knives into his heart?—It is true, indeed, that, in restoring religion to France;

in re-establishing Bishops and Priests, Napoleon has not restored the monks and friars to their convents and their immense property, by the means of which they led such easy lives and wore such fat and rosy cheeks, while those who tilled their land were skin and bone. Their lands were divided amongst us by the republican assemblies, and Napoleon has confirmed their grants. Is it for this that you so hate him? Is it for this that you so becall him? Is it for this that you lay on him with fouler mouths than those which have heretofore been regarded as the exclusive possession of your own dames of Billingsgate? Is it for this that you would have us cut his throat while he is asleep?—Or, are you offended, that he did not restore the *tithes* along with the parochial clergy? Is your zeal for the Church so very great, that you cannot abide the idea of her being robbed of any portion of her inheritance?—Come, come, do not shuffle at this point, at any rate, give us a direct answer. We have read with very erroneous eyes, if you yourselves do not regard tithes as a monstrous grievance; if great numbers of your leading men have not been forming schemes for their abolition in England; if one of your principal noblemen has not stated, to a great meeting of farmers and wool-dealers, that you *laboured under the disadvantage* of tithes, which *neighbouring countries* were free from. Is it, therefore, possible, that this can be the cause of your calling Napoleon a *tyrant*, an *oppressor*, and a man whom we ought to murder, and a man whom we must and shall murder, before you will let us have peace? Would you, indeed, have us butcher our ruler in cold blood, because he has not compelled us to pay the holy church her dues? If this be the cause, or any part of the cause, of your bloody-minded purpose, let us, at any rate, never hear any more of your own grumbling about tithes; for, we are not aware of any law of God, of Nature, or of Nations, making that oppression in England which is not to be deemed oppression in France. —So much for your war for "*holy religion*," as it was called by Mr. John Bowles, the Dutch Commissioner. —Your next object, or rather, objects, of war were, as expressed by that heaven-born minister, Mr. Pitt, "*indemnity for the past and security for the future*." Have you not got indemnity in the thirty millions of subjects which you have

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acquired at Java? In all your immense conquests of territory and of people? In the Dutch and Danish fleets? Or, do you pretend to say, that all these put together are not worth a millionth part of the hundreds of millions that you have expended in the war? Be it so, then; but, would you have us murder Napoleon for that? Did he cause you to expend all these hundreds of millions? And, if he did, is that a reason why we should cut his throat while he is asleep, seeing that the money was expended in a war against us? And, as to "*security for the future*," you cannot, surely, now be apprehensive upon that score, seeing that, as you say, all your nation hold Napoleon in "*contempt*;" seeing that you declare him to be *fallen*; seeing, that from being a conqueror, you now regard him as a desperate wretch struggling for bare existence. Why, then, not suffer him, so contemptible a thing, to exist, it being so obvious, that a poor contemptible ruler in France must tend more to your future security than any thing else could? Why, then, not let us remain unstained with his blood? And, if all this be, at bottom, affected, on your part; if you fear that he will not only deliver France, but again carry the French standards into the territory of her numerous invaders, and, in the end put you in danger; if this be the case, if you think that he will retrieve his fortunes and our glory, and if you do not think us the greatest of fools, or the basest of mankind, can you expect, that, for *this reason* we should become his murderers?—Your war, in its last stage, became a war for "*the deliverance of Europe*." And is not Europe now delivered? Is not Napoleon now ready to make peace even upon the basis proposed by the Allies themselves? What more do you want of him? Would you have us murder him because he has consented to ratify your declared wishes? No, *this* is not the true reason why you want him assassinated. That reason we must look for in another of your publications, where you say: "Is this the time for us to purchase peace for the satisfaction of restoring a veteran army to the Chief who so well knows how to make use of them? Or is it our wish to try how productive the war-taxes will become when we have the same army and navy to maintain us at present, without the means of reaping laurels for the one, or finding prizes for the other; when we have given colonies

"and commerce to the enemy, and have silently withdrawn from both ourselves?" —(Times news-paper, March 1). Oh, Oh! That is it, is it? What, this same Napoleon, whose character, but now, you said you held in *contempt*, is all of a sudden, become a chief, who well knows how to make use of a veteran army! Here you let your real motives peep out. You do not wish that our veterans, who are prisoners of war, should be restored to their country; and, therefore, you would keep on the war; which, by the by, seems not to square very well with all the pity, which you are eternally expressing for our conscripts, whom, one would suppose, you would wish to see return to those "weeping mothers," whose "bleeding bosoms" your Mr. Canning, in the true *Green-Room* style, so pathetically described, in one of his speeches to the wise men of Liverpool. —What of your "*war-taxes*?" Do you love those taxes so much, then, that you wish the war to continue for the pleasure of paying those taxes? Or, do you mean, that they will be continued in peace, and that they will not be so easily paid as they are now, the sources whence they were derived, having been dried up? But, kind friends of ours, why should you keep up "*the same army and the same navy as at present*?" You do not mean to say, surely, that your soldiers and sailors will not suffer themselves to be disbanded? Oh! we have it now! what you mean is, that, if Napoleon continue to be our sovereign, you will not dare to disband, he being so formidable an enemy to you, he "understanding so well how to make use of a veteran army." That is it, is it? and so, you would have us murder him, you would have us not only become assassins, but run the risk of a civil war and the loss of laws and property, you would wish to return to Lettres de Cachet, Gabelles, Corvées, Seigniorial Courts, Provincial Judges, Tithes, and Game-laws, and to kill Napoleon, to cut his throat or stick him while asleep, in order that some weak and unwarlike sovereign should render us too contemptible to put you to the expense of maintaining a large fleet and army in peace, and thereby expose yourselves to pecuniary ruin? No, thank you! It is *your* business to kill him (not by the hands of assassins) on this account; but, it is *our* business to stand by him; to support his authority; and to desire, most anxiously,

‘ a long duration of his life and health. —What! and do we understand you rightly, when you express your dislike of the return of peace to Europe, because then your navy will “*find no prizes?*” We would fain not believe you serious here. The ideas we have always heretofore had, and expressed, of the justice and generosity of the English character must, at least, make us conclude, that those Englishmen, who express such sentiments are few in number; otherwise we must suppose, that your nation has been so much changed by the war and by the writings of mercenary writers, as to have become most shockingly debased. What! would you continue war with all its miseries for the purpose, in part, at least, of enabling your naval officers and seamen to enrich themselves at the expense of innocent traders? Would you see the world remain in its present unhappy state; would you keep in existence all those millions of evils which humanity deploras, for the sake of putting prize-money into the pockets of a part of the English nation? And would you have us murder Napoleon, because he is, as you infer, an enemy to your making those gains?—Again, you object to peace with Napoleon, because it will *give us colonies and commerce*; and thus you show how sincere your regard is for us, how firm a reliance we may place on your *friendship*, at the same time that you make a happy discovery of your own *moderation*, your abhorrence of *conquests* and *ambition*, and you give a clear elucidation of that *disinterestedness*, with which you have laboured in the *deliverance of Europe*.—So that your war, after having been, first, a war for *social order and regular government*; secondly, a war for the “*blessed comforts of religion*,” as described by George Rose; thirdly, a war for “*indemnity for the past and security for the future*,” fourthly, a war for the “*deliverance of Europe*,” is, now, agreeably, to the language of your faction, a war for the keeping of our *conscripts in prison*, for preventing your war taxes from falling off, for giving prizes to your navy, and for (what our Emperor has always, as you say, falsely accused you of) engrossing all the colonies and commerce to yourselves.—Away, therefore, with your advice! Your decorations, if they were as numerous as your taxes, or the millions of your debt, would have no weight with us. You

‘ would fain divide us from our ruler; but, in this you never will succeed as long as we continue to see, that his enemies are the enemies of the power, the glory, and happiness of France?—Such would certainly be, in substance, the answer of the French people to any invitation that the everlasting-war faction might give them to assassinate Napoleon; and, therefore, whatever converts they may make at home, they may, with respect to the people of France, follow the old precept, and “keep their breath to cool their porridge.” And, I am of opinion, too, that the Allies would not be very anxious to get many more bloody noses in a war, which was to have the above objects in view. The powers of the Continent would hardly run any very considerable risk for the sake of *upholding our war-taxes*, though these sentiments of the writer in the Times may furnish them with information that they were not possessed of before.

MR. MANT AND CAPT. CAMPBELL.—

In consequence of the article, containing the Statement and Affidavit of Mr. Mant, which was published in the Register of the 19th of February, Capt. Campbell has thought it necessary to publish, through the same channel, a very short statement of facts, unaccompanied with any reasoning upon the subject, and also an Affidavit, not made by himself, but by Capt. Wilson, of the Navy, who was, as will be seen, at the time referred to, the First Lieutenant of the Frigate *Unité*, on board of which Mr. Mant served, and which Affidavit he submits to a comparison with that of Mr. Mant.—Capt. Campbell states, that, with regard to the point which is the most important to him and to the public, namely, the *illegality of the selling of prizes*, and the other transactions, of which Mr. Mant, in his pamphlet, speaks in so loose a manner, the transactions were all made matter of charge against him by Mr. Mant to the Admiralty, in 1812, while Capt. Campbell was abroad, and after he had, by writing to the Transport Board, prevented Mr. Mant from being appointed to a Prison Ship; that, upon receiving this charge against him, the Lords of the Admiralty ordered Sir Edward Pellew, then become the Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean, to inquire into the matter; that Sir Edward Pellew, after such inquiry, informed their Lordships, that there was no ground for the charge, which he denominated a base attempt; that the Lords of

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the Admiralty hereupon informed Sir Edward Pellew, that his report was perfectly satisfactory to them; and he states, that, in the transactions, as far as they really did take place, there was nothing contrary to the laws and usages in force, and in constant practice in the Mediterranean. He states, that, with regard to the commencement of this dispute, Mr. Mant not only began it by preferring charges against him while he was abroad, but that he found, upon his return home, that Mr. Mant had long been in the practice of showing to several respectable persons about Southampton the papers of which he speaks in his pamphlet, and also of reflecting most scandalously on Capt. Campbell's character, which induced Capt. Campbell to show the papers he possessed, in his own vindication, to his friends, and particularly to his brother officers in that neighbourhood; and that the real reason why he declined furnishing Mr. Mant with *copies* of the papers was, that he thought the request quite impertinent, seeing that Mr. Mant knew so well what the nature of the charges was, and seeing that the papers were, for the most part, in his own hand writing; besides which, Capt. Campbell wished, of all things, to avoid any thing like a controversy with Mr. Mant.—Capt. Campbell has no desire to add to the weight with which Mr. Mant is loaded, and would fain avoid saying one word as to his conduct in the transactions referred to; but, justice to himself and to the public demands a fact or two on that subject. He, therefore, states, that, with regard to Mr. Mant's *ignorance* of the pretended illegality of the transactions, and to his having *resigned* his occupation as agent in the concerns when he discovered their illegality, the fact is, that he was *removed* by the captors, on account of their conviction, that he had acted *unfairly* in the business, and was, from the same cause, excluded from messing with the officers in the *Unité*, as he had formerly done, which facts are known to so many persons, that they must be deemed indisputable.—As to the fact, alleged so stoutly by Mr. Mant, and to which so much weight is given in his defence; namely, that he was not fully informed of the accusations against him, nor of the name of his accuser, *until it was too late to confront him with that accuser*, a fact, if true, of very great importance, Captain Campbell states nothing, but refers the public to the subjoined Affidavit of Capt. Wilson, who was, at the time referred to, the First Lieutenant of the Ship; after the perusal of

which Affidavit, he is persuaded that no person will need any thing more in answer to any charge resting upon the *veracity* of Mr. Mant.

MR. WILSON'S AFFIDAVIT.

John Wilson, commander in the Royal Navy, maketh oath, That in the years 1806, 1807, and until Oct. 1808, he was senior Lieutenant of His Majesty's ship *Unité*, of which ship, and during which time, Mr. Thomas Mant was Surgeon; that Captain Patrick Campbell took command of the said ship (then off Cadiz) in August 1806, and was immediately ordered, with command of a small squadron, to the Adriatic. That the said Mr. Thomas Mant, in consequence of his knowledge of the Italian language, was intrusted to manage the prize concerns of the squadron at Trieste, &c.; that in the month of October 1807, the ship then off the Island of Lussin, on her way to cruize off Corfu, information was received, that passes intrusted by Captain Campbell to Mr. Mant, to deliver to merchants at Trieste, had been sold, and that Mr. Mant had derived emolument from such sale, and also received money for undervaluing prizes. That on the ship's arrival at Malta in December following, Mr. Mant made application to Captain Campbell to be allowed to go home, on pretence of ill health, or to exchange into another ship, which Captain Campbell refused, and told him, in the Deponent's presence, of the accusations against him, of receiving money for passes and undervaluing prizes, and until these charges were done away he could not comply with his request. That on the ship's return to the Adriatic early in 1808, this Deponent informed Mr. Mant, that George Jursovich, who accused him (Mr. Mant) of receiving two hundred dollars for letting him (Jursovich) have, on advantageous terms, prize goods which he bought, was then on board, and that it was necessary he (Mr. Mant) should clear himself from such accusation, or that he should be considered guilty of the charge; his reply was, that Jursovich was a damned rascal, and his word was as good as Jursovich's. The ship was several months up the Adriatic after this conversation took place; and although Jursovich was frequently on board, which Mr. Mant could not be ignorant of, yet Mr. Mant, to the Deponent's knowledge, never attempted to clear himself. In another conversation nearly about the same time, which the Deponent had with Mr. Mant relative to the sale of passes and undervaluing prizes,

the Deponent asked Mr. Mant, if he could lay his hand on his heart and say, he (Mr. Mant) had never received money on either account; Mr. Mant answered the Deponent by saying, it was nothing to him whether he received any or not, that he had taken the opinion of counsel on the subject and was desired not to criminate himself. This Deponent further saith, That he never heard Mr. Mant express any compunction for the share he had in the supposed illegality of the disposal of prize property in which he was a voluntary agent, and instead of withdrawing himself from the said agency, from any such compunction, he was removed from it by the captors, they having lost their confidence in him.

J. WILSON, Captain,
Royal Navy.

Sworn before me at Southamp-
ton, 1st March, 1814,
Thomas Ducell, J. P. for
the Town of Southampton.

GERMAN SUFFERERS.

SIR,—We are not called upon to ransack the library of the novelist for melancholy and affecting tales; the common occurrences of life will always furnish mankind, at least those of a mental turn, with matter sufficient to depress the powers of levity. But common concerns are of little moment when compared with those which now command the attention of Europe, and in which the fate of millions of human beings are deeply involved. Emperors, Kings, and Princes are tearing their subjects from the bosom of their families, to die—Where?—why, in what they are pleased to call the field of *honor*. But, however honorable such a death may be in their estimation, I can hear but of one, amongst the whole group, who makes a point of coming *within* the range of a cannon-ball; the rest rather choosing, for reasons of state, to preserve their *valuable* lives to the latest period, that they may then pour out their last breath on the bed of ease and indolence. —However, this reflection is not the only motive which induces me to solicit a page in your useful Register, and which, if I am refused, will neither hurt my pride nor wound my feelings, as I shall enjoy the consolation of having used my endeavour to prevent an evil which appears to me calculated to promote animosities and discord in many parishes. —A good name is certainly valuable; but let me take *just* and *proper* methods to acquire that good name. Some years ago, a being, in human form, in order to gain the esteem of his pot-com-

panions, gave them, what may be justly called, a good dinner; namely, roast beef, plum pudding, and four gallons of porter. On that very day, a friend of mine called at the *donor's* house, where he found a wife and five children who actually had not bread to eat, until the uncle (for such my friend really was to the infants) gave the mother a guinea to purchase food. I need not tell you, Sir, that such a character was unworthy the name of a husband and a father, and a disgrace to both. Will not the same observation, when applied to an individual, hold good as to a nation that acts in a similar manner? You have heard of a gentleman who, in a tavern speech, lamented that he was not so high in the church as his nephew was in the army. I suppose the good man (for I verily believe him to be a good man) meant, that if he was a bishop, every parish church in his diocese should be opened for a collection for the suffering Germans. He has since tried the experiment in his own chapel, and I am informed that he collected 400*l*. Very well; let the suffering Germans have it; and if those warm advocates for these Germans had made private subscriptions amongst themselves; nay, had they sent their whole fortunes to Germany, they would have heard nothing from me. But why make a parish affair of it? The hint, Sir, is taken by the church, and you may be sure that it will spread to the utmost corners of the empire. Every minister that will not open his mouth for the suffering Germans, will be looked upon as *disaffected* to the state. But that is not the extent of the evil. The parish officers will hold the dishes (for plates will be too small) at the church-door. *They* know each housekeeper; and every inhabitant who may think that his poor suffering neighbour has a greater claim to his bounty than the suffering Germans, and chooses to pass the dish without a donation, will be immediately denominated a *Jacobin*, an enemy to his country, and a friend of Buonaparté. But a *small* donation will not do. The minister, who is to preach next Sunday for the benefit of the suffering Germans, declared, that he expected his congregation to be *very liberal*; it was for the *honor* of the nation. I know "Church and State" to be an old song. Religion, that is to say, genuine religion and politics, have no affinity to each other, and can no more claim an union than the mire of the streets can pretend to be sterling gold: it is a most unpleasant mixture, and

is as unsavory to the mind as a compound of honey and mustard would be to the palate.

— I say, *politics* must make a part of the sermon; the distress of the suffering Germans must be pointed out; then the *cause* of the distress, which is *the war*.—Here I could wish to make a very long pause, as I cannot help thinking, that there are hundreds of thousands of suffering English and Irish in the United Kingdom, who have a much greater claim upon the humanity and honor of the nation, than the suffering Germans.— I deny that the Germans have any claim upon the gratitude of the nation, *as a nation*. But I will allow, that they have a claim upon many thousands of individuals in the nation, now living. They have a claim upon the whole body of the *alarmists*, at the head of whom stood that political apostate Pitt; that bitter scourge to Britain and to civil liberty. They have a claim upon the *life and fortune* gentlemen. They have a claim upon the *Corporate Bodies*. They have a claim upon the *Rotten Boroughs*, who have bound themselves, by their signatures to their addresses; and they have a claim upon *Government Contractors* of every description. All these compose what may properly be called the *war-faction*.—These are the men, the very men, upon whom the suffering Germans have a claim. They have been the cause, the only cause of the war. It is unjust to say that the suffering Germans have a claim upon the nation.—Take the nation at large, eighteen out of twenty, were against going to war with the French, because they chose to make an alteration in their Government.—The very best friends the nation then had, and still have, were entirely against the war, and are so to this hour. Had their advice been attended to, Britain, in point of circumstances, would have been just the reverse of what she now is, and Germany in a state of tranquillity. It is true, the friends of the country wished a *reform*, and I humbly hope they will one day obtain it. It is certain the real friend of his country did not desire a reformation before it was greatly wanted. It is equally certain, it was *not a revolution* he looked for.—The alarmists, to gain their point, instantly let loose their favourite Hobgoblins, *Fear and Dread*, twisted, and dressed up in the most terrific form and colours. To oppose and attack those two monsters, the whole Regiment of these renowned Knights the *Life and Fortune* gentlemen, turned out to a man.—But the alarmists were too wise to be scared by ghosts of their own raising; they had their *fears* 'tis

true; but those fears sprung from quite a different source. *Theirs* was a fear of losing their *Sinecures* and lucrative places, which, rather than part with, they preferred reducing the nation to what it now is. However those two unmanly spirits are, by the aid of some divines, (Bishops I suppose) happily laid for a *limited* period. Not in the Red Sea, where the old women's spirits are usually laid, but in the snuff-box of a Minister of State.—But why, in the name of fortune, should there be so much sympathy for the suffering Germans, and so little feeling for the suffering English? I have heard of no Tavern speeches, proposing a general opening of church pulpits, (this severe winter) for the benefit of the many, many thousands of *our own* suffering poor, who have actually wanted bread.—I know but of one church in the City of London, the pulpit of which has been devoted to so laudable a purpose; and, to the honor of the Rector be it spoken, (whose heart is abundantly blest with the milk of human kindness and fellow feeling,) it was that of the church of St. Ann, Blackfriars.—The same gentleman, I understand, proposes, from the best of motives, though he has not taken into consideration the extent of the injury, to devote the same pulpit for the Benefit of the suffering Germans.—It should be remembered, however, that the Germans have been fighting,—*not for us*, but for *themselves*.—They have been fighting their *own* battles, in which, as a nation, we are not interested. It is true, our good souls have given to the respective sovereigns of Germany, who have caused their troops to take the field, many millions of pounds in hard cash, by way of subsidy;—and it is equally true, if there is any comfort in the information, that our children, and, great, great grand children, will have to toil and labour for money to *pay the interest* of the many millions of hard guineas which have so pleasingly filled the coffers of the German princes. Therefore, it is to their respective sovereigns, that the suffering Germans ought to look for assistance. Their princes have received the British guineas, and their princes are in duty bound to attend to the wants of their suffering subjects.—If I had a few dollars to spare (as for guineas they are all fled to the Continent,) I should think myself a base wretch to send them to the suffering Germans, while I have so many suffering neighbours, who cannot procure sufficient bread for themselves and families.—I should, by such an act, be an exact copy of that worthless being I

have mentioned above, who, to gain a good name, indulged Jack Noaks and Tom Styles with a good dinner, while his feeling heart left his wife and family without bread. No! rather let me attend to the wants of those dear children, those sixty out of seventy school-boys, who had not wherewith to break their fast, until the humanity of the school-master supplied their craving wants.—How many, many thousands of my fellow countrymen are at this very moment in a similar situation, who have a much stronger claim upon my bounty than foreigners, for I am taught to believe, that "charity begins at home."—You are at liberty to bestow what name or appellation upon me you please, but I am convinced, from my own feelings, that I am a FRIEND TO HUMANITY.
Blackfriars, 2d March, 1814.

DUTCH INDEPENDENCE.—It appears at last that the wise-acres, who lately excited the clamour of *Orange Boon*, and saw nothing in the restoration of the house of Orange but the overthrow of Napoleon's dynasty, begin to think that they were too sanguine in their expectations, and that the Dutch, like all other nations who have once tasted of liberty, are not so wedded to the divine rights of kings, or to hereditary monarchy, as to be insensible of the difference between a free representative government, and that in which the dictum of one individual is paramount to the law. When the French Emperor ventured to give Holland a king, the enormity of the deed was stigmatized as without a parallel: it was held up as an instance of despotism far surpassing all his former acts of tyranny, and the deplorable situation to which the Dutch people were thereby reduced, was said to be infinitely worse than that of the most abject state of slavery recorded in history. The miseries of the poor Hollanders were, indeed, painted in such glowing colours, that even the "flinty heart of their tyrant" was said at times to relent, when he contemplated the "fell havoc" which his "cursed ambition" had made amongst this gallant people. But mark the difference when the inauguration of a sovereign, vested with the same unlimited powers of a Buonaparté, came to be the act and deed, at least to receive the countenance and support of the good people of this country; when they assumed to themselves the right of establishing a new order of things, of putting down even the bare semblance of a Republic, and of destroying the last remains of liberty in the extinction of the

States General, and erecting in its stead a hereditary kingly government, "a sovereign prince of the United Netherlands." Observe, I say, how soon these men changed their note, when the giving of a king to Holland was done in a way which conformed to their views, and in which they somewhat participated. The measure became, all on a sudden, a grand and sublime effort of the genius of this country; a bright emanation from that "happy constitution" which is the "envy of the world," and of which none can form a just estimate but those who live under its "benign influence." Here the magnanimity of Englishmen had reached its climax; for what could be more generous, what more noble, what more elevated, than to confer a portion of that liberty which Englishmen enjoy upon a people who were no way solicitous about it?—One would have thought that this unlooked for favour; this unexampled generosity; this anxiety to restore a whole nation to independence, to happiness, and to security, equal to what we enjoy under "the best government on earth," would have called forth the warmest acknowledgments of the Dutch; have stimulated them to throw off the Napoleon yoke; have roused them to expel their oppressors; and led them to present a barrier to the future encroachments of Buonaparté, which even all his legions could never overthrow. Had this people been in reality the unwilling and abject slaves of the ruler of France; had their sufferings been even less severe than they were represented, it was unquestionably the fittest moment they could have chosen to emancipate themselves from this disgraceful vassalage, when the power of their oppressor was broken, when he himself was under the necessity of becoming a suppliant, and when the whole strength and resources of Great Britain were employed in endeavouring to crush him for ever, and to raise from the dust all those nations who had been compelled to acknowledge his "tremendous sway."—It appears, however, that the Dutch entertained a very different view of the matter from what was held on this side the water. If, they were in reality oppressed by one sovereign, they seem to have thought that they might be oppressed by another. Buonaparté had altered the form of their government, in lieu of which he had established his own sovereignty. The Prince of Orange had supplanted this assumption of power by declaring himself the sovereign prince of the Netherlands. Here, then, was a mere change of masters, in which the peo-

ple saw nothing worth fighting for. At least, having had a trial of Buonaparté's government, they were not, perhaps, so very tired of it as to determine, all at once, to sacrifice their lives for the new king, of whose government they had had no trial, and which had nothing more favourable in its aspect than the former to recommend it. This train of reasoning was naturally to be expected of a people so proverbially phlegmatic as the Dutch. The page of history no doubt represents that nation, at one period, engaged in a gallant and successful opposition to foreign domination. But in that case the consequence of submission was the entire loss of independence, while the advantages of resistance were manifest and incalculably great. In the present instance, and supposing them to have been stripped of their political rights by Buonaparté, it no where appears that the Prince of Orange intended to restore them. On the contrary, his Royal Highness took upon himself the title of a king, and, it is to be presumed, he has since exercised all the powers of sovereignty. It is true, the noise and clamour which the first news of this counter-revolution occasioned, and the importance which government attached to it, operated, for a while, to make some believe that the *people* of Holland had in truth thrown off the French yoke. In the House of Commons it was said, by Lord Castlereagh, that this revolution was "the result of the *spontaneous* and *unanimous* wish of the *people* of Holland of *all parties*;"—and the event was every where hailed as a triumph of freedom over oppression. But the less credulous were not long in discovering that the *people* had nothing to say in the business; that they interested themselves as little, perhaps less, in the fate of William the first, the "Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands," as what they did in the fate of the Emperor Napoleon. In no shape did they justify Lord Castlereagh's statement; for if the impulse had been *spontaneous* and *unanimous* in favour of William, this would have been seen in its corresponding effects. All Holland would have been in arms to make good the claims of the house of Orange. Like France, the voice of the sovereign would have aroused the people; like France they would have united their fortunes to his; and, like France, they would have discomfited the armies, and baffled the projects of all the combined Powers of Europe. But no—the Dutch were actuated by no such feeling. Whether they were attached to Buonaparté, or had experienced the beneficial

effects of the excellent code of laws which he has established; whatever were their motives for acting the part they did, it is certain they never gave that support to the new government which it was asserted they had given. On the contrary, though Napoleon was compelled, by reverse of fortune, almost to abandon Holland to its fate, "the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands" has not been able to clear his kingdom of French troops, even with the assistance of at least 10,000 of our best troops, an incalculable quantity of military stores, and a sum of money from this country fully adequate to his views. But men and money can accomplish nothing in the cause of a sovereign, when that cause, as is evidently the case here, is not also the cause of the people. This is a fact of which we ought to, (and I am certain might) have informed ourselves better than we did, when we espoused the interests of the house of Orange. Had we acted in this cautious and prudent manner, we might have avoided the disgrace which must attend the withdrawing our troops from Holland, without accomplishing the object for which they were sent thither; and we might have saved the Prince of Orange the mortification which he must feel if, as is likely to happen, he should be forced to relinquish a crown, which was assumed without any calculation of chances as to the probability of his being able to retain it. But instead of acting in this way, the proceedings were gone into with the greatest rashness by the managers in this political drama, and the lookers on, without any regard to the consequences, displayed the most consummate folly in the applause which they gave to the first act of a piece which so very soon disappointed their hopes, and which may now, in all probability, terminate fatally to the individuals who were urged on, by the most flattering promises, to become the chief actors. But this is not all. Our news-paper press, with its usual regard for truth and justice, has commenced an indiscriminate and abusive attack upon the people of Holland and the house of Orange, because the result of the event which they were so active in promoting (and on the failure of which every judicious person might easily have calculated) has not been what they expected, and what they were so forward in telling the public it would assuredly be. The *Times* paper, which takes the lead when any dirty work is to be performed, has opened its budget of abuse with the following article:—"The Dutch proceed very *leisurely* in their efforts to *distinguish*

themselves among the *allied nations*. Gorcum was taken possession of on the 20th instant; but Naarden, *even yet*, shows no indication of an intention to surrender. It is difficult to say whether this *supineness* reflects more *discredit* on the *people* or on the *government*; but we cannot help thinking, that one or the other must be *much to blame* to suffer the existence of any foreign garrison in the heart of their country so long after all external danger has been removed from the frontiers. Do they still allow the traitor Verhuel to insult them with impunity? Do they not look on the fortresses occupied by a foreign force, as the very badges of their recent slavery, most intolerable to the eyes of freemen?—The other *allied powers* have a right to expect that Holland shall not set an example of *apathy* in the sacred cause. Unless *they* see in her a spirit to maintain her independence, *they* will hardly venture to guarantee, much less to secure it by stronger barriers, or *new accessions of territory*; and if the House of Orange does not act up to its hereditary greatness, it will be ill suited to *an union with that of Brunswick*."—So, if the Dutch *people*, according to this writer, do not make common cause with the Allies against France, they are to be punished with the loss of independence, and of new accessions of territory; and if the Prince of Orange does not do what his subjects will not let him do; if he does not accomplish an *impossibility*, he is to be punished also, by denying to his son his affianced bride, the Princess Charlotte of Wales, who, we have long known, was destined to be the wife of the hereditary Prince of Orange. I dare say the Dutch *people* feel themselves very little interested in the business. To them it must appear a matter of indifference whether the man who is to be their ruler marries a greasy Hottentot or a refined European. Their views chiefly centre in commerce, and from the experience which they have acquired during the last 20 years, I am inclined to think, if the question were asked them, that they would prefer an alliance with Buonaparté's family to that of every other, because they would find it more conducive to their *interest*. But to punish the house of Orange for the fault of another; for misplaced confidence in the patriotism of a nation, after being assured by Lord Castlereagh that that nation had *spontaneously* and *unanimously* declared in their favour, would be a species of cruelty and injustice unexampled in history. The most absurd and curious part of the *Times*' statement is,

that which respects the *Allies*. It appears, that it was at one time in contemplation to enlarge the ancient boundaries of Holland by "new accessions of territory," and this idea is fully warranted by the *new title* which William the First assumed when he landed in Holland. But it is not so clear that the *allied powers* were parties to this arrangement, or that it had even been communicated to them prior to that Prince's declaration. It seems to have originated entirely with this country; and as a proof that neither the sovereigns of Russia, Austria, nor Prussia were consulted in the business, we find them, at the breaking out of the counter-revolution, offering to Napoleon to recognise the title of his brother Louis to the crown of Holland. It was *our* interest undoubtedly, in the event of a family compact, that that kingdom should be *enlarged*. Though this might not give *us* direct possession, it would extend our influence on the Continent; and, what is of far greater consequence, enable us to cripple the maritime power of Buonaparté. Here is the true secret of our anxious wishes for the restoration of the Orange family. Not the emancipation of the Dutch *people* from the tyrant of France, but the establishment of an order of things in Holland, which would enlarge our political influence, and increase our means of annoying our greatest enemy. Hence our wish to get possession of Antwerp; hence our anxiety to burn or get into our power the Scheldt fleet, and hence the virulence of the *Times*, the *Courier*, and the whole tribe of hireling writers, against Admiral Verhuel, whom they impudently denominate a *traitor*, because he is acting in strict conformity to his oath of allegiance, and in a way which does credit to his valour and to his integrity. Instead of landing the army under General Graham at a point where, from the well-known skill and courage of that gallant officer, something might have been effected, in conjunction with the Allies, of importance to the common cause, these troops were ordered to take the nearest route to Antwerp, in the expectation, no doubt, that that place, amidst the consternation and confusion which prevailed, would be taken by surprise, or present a feeble resistance to a besieging army. Could the Allies be ignorant of all this? Are they so stupid as not to have discovered in this proceeding the particular object we had in view? Is it to be supposed that they are not aware of the policy which influences Great Britain in her hostility against France? that it is the annihilation

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of her maritime power which we aim at; and that, this once effected, they may perhaps find it necessary at no very distant period, to arm against us in defence of their own naval rights. In these circumstances, it is ridiculous to talk of the Allies having a *right* to expect any thing from the *people* of Holland. It must, in the first instance, be shown that the Sovereigns of Europe are disposed to forward *our views* as to that country; that they are willing the succession to the crown should be fixed in the Orange family; that the proposed matrimonial alliance with this country should be carried into effect; and that they are inclined to submit to the vast accession of maritime power which this would eventually give us. It is proper, I say, to clear up these necessary points, before we presume to threaten the Dutch people or the house of Orange; because we might, perhaps, find, as we have often done, when it was too late, that it is one thing to manage a government and a people when they look upon us as friends, and another when we have made them our enemies by our arrogant and unjust pretensions. Whatever the aggregate of the English nation may think, it is very clear to me, that the allied powers will not stand by and suffer Great Britain to maintain the sovereignty of the seas, while their own rights, as naval powers possessing a large extent of sea coast, are compromised; nor do I believe they will permit France, Holland, or the other maritime states, to become a prey to the inordinate ambition of any sovereign, be his power and pretensions what they may.

MURAT, KING OF NAPLES.—I dare say the Emperor Napoleon begins to think that the kings he was lately so active in making, have turned out rather scurvy fellows.—First, Bernadotte deserts his cause, leagues with the Allies, and then invades France, regardless of what fools may say about patriotism, and rebellion against one's country. Then comes the alleged defection of Murat, a personage whom, we had every reason to believe, was the *particular* favourite of Buonaparté, and who always evinced a decided attachment to his cause. It was some time, I confess, before I could persuade myself that this last sovereign of Napoleon's creation had followed the example of the "great Prince of Sweden," and, like him, taken up arms against his native country. But this reluctance on my part, I now find, was owing to inattention; for if I had considered aright the *nature* of those stimulants

which have been used to bring Murat round to the cause of the Allies, I could not for a moment have hesitated as to the fact. It no where appears that Britain is to allow the King of Naples a subsidy in money, as we do Bernadotte for his *magnanimous* conduct. But Murat has received, and actually taken possession of territory, as a *bonus* for joining in the "sacred cause," equal in point of real value to the whole kingdom of Naples.—The *Courier* at first told us that Murat was "to have an *accession* of "territory from the Papal States." It appears, however, he has not only got a *part*, but the whole of these States; he has taken "possession of the south of Italy as far as "the right bank of the Po."—Why the Allies should have given up so much; why they should have sacrificed so large a portion of this fine country, for the mere co-operation of a Power like Naples, has excited a good deal of surprise. Our newspapers, such as the *Times* and the *Courier*, have attempted to create doubts as to the arrangement, on account of the very advantageous terms obtained by Murat.—Others again, while they give implicit credit to the fact, have thought they discovered some symptoms in the transaction of a scheme, a stratagem, on the part of Napoleon, to save Naples from falling into the hands of the Allies, at a moment when, from the dangers which threatened him on all sides, he could not afford her any succours in case she should be attacked by a superior force.—As to the apparent defection of Murat, I see no reason to doubt this because he has obtained better terms than the *Times* and *Courier* would have allowed him. But I have not discovered any thing which enables me to form a positive opinion as to the other point—namely, that the whole is the result of a deep policy on the part of Napoleon to preserve Naples. This may be the case; it is likely enough; but, as far as is yet seen, nothing positive can be advanced on the subject. Still, sufficient has transpired to satisfy me, that Murat has *not* been a *willing* instrument in the business, but has yielded only to circumstances, which he could not control. In short, that it was *necessity*, as in the case of the Danes, which led him to join the Allies. In proof of this, we have his own proclamation, published at Milan, on the 17th of January, which runs as follows:—"Milan, Jan. 30th. The King of Naples, "on the 17th inst. issued the following "proclamation:—Having, for *sundry* "weighty causes, found ourselves OBLIGED "to adopt measures for being-admitted into

"the Alliance of the States united against France, we have in this instance been successful. We have given up the three islands situated opposite to Naples, and our whole fleet: but for this we are to have a sufficient compensation. We are going to take possession of the South of Italy, as far as to the right bank of the Po. We shall always remember our duty; and those persons in office who have always performed their's, and who have made no opposition to our measures, may assuredly reckon on our protection, and on keeping their respective posts."

—From this document it is sufficiently clear, that Murat was *obliged*, from "sun-dry weighty causes" not explained, to solicit an alliance with the powers "united against France." It requires very little penetration to discover what these causes were. He could not be ignorant of the recent disasters of France, on which alone Naples can depend for assistance in the hour of danger. Surrounded on all sides by the enemies of that sovereign to whom he owed every thing, it was, indeed, a wise and profound policy on the part of the Neapolitan king to avert the threatening storm by conciliation. Whether this was the result of Buonaparté's schemes or not, it seems to me that terms have been obtained by Naples, much more favourable than she had any reason to expect. These, indeed, have excited the indignation of the *Courier*, which exclaims, "A sufficient compensation with a vengeance! for as the Po, having its source in the Alps in Savoy, flows into the sea, north of Comacchio, Murat would, besides Naples, have all the Papal States, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Bologna, &c.!"

It is no way surprising to find our hireling press venting its spleen in this way; but it is somewhat singular, if we can believe Buonaparté *serious*, to see him censuring the conduct of Murat, recalling, as he has done, all Frenchmen from Naples, and denouncing them defaulters, who would be "pursued by the agents of the public government," if they did not "return into the territory of the empire within the space of three months." Napoleon is either acting a double part in the business, or he is become quite unreasonable if, as Murat says, he was actually *obliged* to adopt measures for being admitted into the alliance. By that step he has not only preserved Naples from being invaded by the Allies, but all Italy to the south of the Po; and young Beauharnois has shewn by his late successes, that the rest of Italy

may safely be left to his care. Should Murat, however, have been influenced by motives really *hostile* towards Buonaparté, of which the latter, it must be acknowledged, is the best judge, he has only himself to blame for confiding so much as he has done in his generals, and showing so great a partiality for the craft of king-making. He may, perhaps, at this moment, be accusing himself, and repenting his ill-placed confidence; but he should recollect, that kings are but men, whose vices and propensities do not always change with a change of circumstances. He should also remember, that he is not the first sovereign who has had to struggle against the treachery of friends. King Henry the Vth had much to complain of in that way; and although I never was a great admirer of Shakespeare, I cannot resist the temptation, for once, of giving an extract from the above play, which, I think, contains a pretty apt illustration of the point under consideration:

----- But oh!
What shall I say to thee, LORD SCROOP, thou cruel,
Ungrateful, savage, and inhuman monster!
Thou that didst bear the key of all my counsels,
That knew of the very bottom of my soul,
That almost might'st have coin'd me into gold.
Would'st thou have practis'd on me for thy use?
May it be possible that *foreign hire*
Could out of thee extract one spark of evil
That might annoy my finger? 'Tis so strange,
That though the truth of it stand off as gross
As black and white, mine eye will scarcely see it.
Treason and murder ever kept together
As two yoke-devils, sworn to either's purpose,
Working so grossly in a natural cause,
That admiration did not whoop at them;
But thou 'gainst all proportion didst bring in
Wonder, to wait on treason and on murder;
And whatsoever cunning fiend it was
That wrought upon thee so preposterously,
Hath got the voice in hell for excellence:
And other devils that suggest by treasons
Do botch and bungle up damnations
With patches, colours, and with forms, being
fetched
From glittering semblances of piety;
But he that temper'd thee bade thee stand up,
Gave thee as instance why thou shouldst do treason
Unless to dub thee with the name of traitor.
If that same demon that hath gull'd thee thus,
Should, with his lion-gait, walk the whole world,
He might return to vasty Tartar back,
And tell the legions, I can never win
A soul so easily as I won his.

King Henry the Vth, Act the 2nd.

PEACE OR WAR?—If we are to judge from the altered tone of that vile press, which has, for twenty years, sacrificed every principle of justice, of honour, and of humanity, to its interested clamour for interminable war, the great question is now about to be settled, and Europe once more restored to a state of peace. Not many

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days have elapsed since we were told in the *Courier*, that the Allies had *determined* not to make peace with the Emperor of France *until they were in possession of his capital*. This insolent language was doubtless suited to the narrow views of those who had been all along endeavouring to persuade the country, that France was sunk in a state of apathy, and unwilling to continue the contest any longer in support of its present government. It was language quite consistent with the assurances they gave their readers, that the Allies were actually in possession of Paris, and were about to "dethrone the tyrant," and restore to France the "*mild and virtuous* sway of the house of Bourbon." In fine, it was language every way becoming men who talked and boasted thus in the absence of the intelligence of Napoleon's victories, which, like a powerful talisman, has in one instant overthrown their vain and towering hopes, and converted their imperious exultation into doleful lamentations. Those, in particular, who were the most active in sounding the everlasting war-whoop, and who *piously* told us that "to make peace with Buonaparté would be to make war against virtue and against God," are now the most forward in proclaiming their expectations of an *immediate* peace. It has been this expectation, they say, which has led to another prorogation of parliament to the 21st instant, before which day, they confidently assure us, the preliminaries will have been signed; not merely by the ministers of Russia, Prussia, and the other continental powers, but also by Lord Castlereagh in behalf of this country. This is what the newspapers, who pretend to be in the secret, and who, only the other day, told us a very different story, would now have us to believe is the state of the negotiation for peace. It is possible that what they say *may* at last be true; these lying oracles *may* for *once* have spoken the truth, and many of their former dupes, notwithstanding the repeated proofs they have had of their total disregard of all honest principle, may credit every iota of it. For my part, however, I confess that peace, a *general* peace such as these newspapers have described, is an event which does not appear to me so very near. The recent disasters of the Allies, may have disposed the minds of those who manage our affairs *at home*, to pursue more peaceable measures with the French Emperor than we were lately taught to expect; and this may have superinduced a persuasion in some minds, that nothing now stands in the way of an

amicable termination of the negotiation. With such shallow-minded people, Great Britain is every thing; she is the fulcrum which moves and directs all the proceedings at Chatillon; she is the pivot upon which the whole must turn. To say nothing of France, with a population of 30 millions of people, who are now in a condition to dictate terms to their invaders, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and the whole of the confederates must, according to these sage politicians, submit to be controlled by the whim and caprice of this country; must prosecute the war if England resolves on war; must make peace if it suits her pleasure. Highly absurd and ridiculous as this must make us appear in the eyes of other nations, it is a sort of language not only to be found in the mouths of thousands who can neither read nor write, but, to their eternal disgrace, of thousands more who have received a liberal education, and, of course, ought to know better. In fact, the same false ideas with regard to national importance and national superiority, pervades all ranks, and disgustingly obtrudes itself upon our notice in every news-paper and political pamphlet which issues from the press. The period is fast approaching when the eyes of mankind will be open to this horrible delusion, and when they will be made sensible of the folly of treating every other nation with contempt that does not bow to the mandates of an unjust and imperious domination. But let peace come when it may, it will be found, to our sad experience, that it would have been more to the advantage of Great Britain if, instead of assuming a dictatorial tone, and being the prime mover in the greater part, if not in all the coalitions that have been formed against France, she had confined her views to the improvement of her manufactures, to her agricultural pursuits, and to the encouragement of the other useful arts. Then, indeed, she might have been great; then she might have had reason to be proud of her superiority. But she preferred a state of ruinous warfare, which has had the effect of giving to the people against whom she fought, the pre-eminence she might have enjoyed; and caused herself to tremble at the prospect of peace, which she dreads because it must be fatal to millions, and place the country in a situation in which it will poignantly feel all the pernicious effects consequent on the destructive system which has so long desolated Europe. No one can suppose me an enemy to peace, without supposing me destitute of the common feelings of humanity. But I cannot

join with those who flatter themselves that a peace with France, *in the present state of things*, will prove a blessing to this country. Much, very much indeed, must be done in the way of *reform*, before any of the comforts which many look for, in a suspension of hostilities, can be realized. Meanwhile, it does appear to me, that a *general* peace is neither so near nor so easily to be obtained as most people are inclined to believe. The multitude of interests involved; the extent of territory to be adjusted; the continental and maritime rights of the belligerents, which have been rendered complex by the long endurance of the contest, and the different pretences, and arrogant assumptions of ambitious individuals; are points not to be settled in a day, or a month, perhaps not in a year. As a preliminary point, I think Napoleon may insist upon the evacuation of the soil of France by the Allies. It was while they were on the *other side* of the Rhine, that he agreed to the terms which they proposed as a basis of a peace. They refused to give his ambassador a passport, though fully empowered to enter upon an immediate negociation; and followed up that refusal by an invasion of the territory of France. Napoleon even suspended all military operations, till they had penetrated into the heart of his kingdom. Conferences were no doubt held at Chatillon, said to be of a pacific nature; but it was a strange way of settling the terms of peace by cutting each other's throats. It was impossible both parties could be sincere. Now that the Emperor of France has lowered the presumption of those who would listen to no terms until they were in possession of his capital. I am inclined to think he will not treat with the enemies of France till they re-assume the position which they occupied when he signified his acquiescence in their original proposals. He may meet the views of the Allies so far as to consent to a suspension of hostilities; but I am persuaded he will not go into discussions respecting a definitive treaty, until the whole of the invading army has re-crossed the Rhine. If this should be his plan, and the Allies refuse to accede to it, we may then, instead of an immediate peace, have war in perpetuity.

THE EMPEROR NAPOLEON AND HIS ARMY.—What I foresaw in my last, without pretending to the spirit of prophecy, and which any other man, who ex-

ercised his reasoning powers, might have foreseen as well as me, has actually happened. Napoleon has forced the combined army to fall back to Troyes, 111 miles from Paris, and 75 miles from the point which they had previously reached. This fact was first ascertained by the receipt of dispatches from our military agents who accompany the allied army, the last of which is dated Troyes the 17th ult. These dispatches fully confirm the leading facts stated in the previous French bulletins, and clearly show, that the object of the Allies, the capture of Paris, had completely failed. Since then French official papers have been received to the 25th, in which it is stated, that Buonaparté's headquarters were at Nogent on the 20th, and that his advanced guard was "half way between "Nogent and Troyes;" that is, within 25 miles of the latter place; so that it is more than probable, as Napoleon was bringing forward his troops on all sides, and actively preparing for new and offensive operations, that another battle may have been fought, unless hostilities have been suspended by an armistice. The latest official intelligence which, by the last accounts, was received at Paris from the army, was dated the 20th.—If a battle had been fought on the 24th, or even the 26th, sufficient time has elapsed for the particulars to have reached this country.—That no advices have been received, can only be accounted for upon the supposition that some pacific measure has been adopted, or that the French papers, containing the details of another engagement have been kept back here, as I believe they have often been, to serve stock-jobbing purposes. Be this as it may, I think it cannot be long ere intelligence be received of a decisive nature from one quarter or another.

OCCURRENCES OF THE WAR.—I have little to add, under this head, to what I stated in my last. The storming of Soissons by the Russians, who, it was said, took 3,000 prisoners, 13 pieces of cannon, and killed and wounded between 6 and 7,000 of the enemy, is represented in the French bulletin to have been a very paltry affair. The garrison, it is there stated, consisted only of 1,000 men of the national guards. The redoubtable Winzingerode considered it the safest way, after the mighty achievement of surprising this formidable garrison, to decamp from Soissons, and follow the fortunes of Blucher.